公司治理结构、盈余管理动机与长期资产减值转回——来自我国上市公司的经验证据

Corporate Goverance,Earning Management Motives and Reversal of Value Decline of Long-lived Assets——an Empirical Evidence from China's Securities Markets

本文在新《资产减值准则》的研究框架下,结合公司治理理论,对我国上市公司的公司治理特征、盈余管理动机与长期资产减值转回相互关系进行了实证分析。本文以2001年至2004年所有A股上市公司为样本,实证研究发现:(1)董事会和总经理两职合一、管理层薪酬外部竞争优势弱化、未设置独立审计委员会的公司越倾向于长期资产减值转回进行盈余管理;(2)具有扭亏动机、配股动机的公司越倾向进行长期资产减值转回,具有大清洗动机和利润平滑动机的公司越倾向长期资产减值不转回;(3)未来收益能力和经济环境不影响长期资产减值转回。文章还对政府经济管理部门、上市公司监管部门、上市公司利益相关者及上市公司管理层提出了建议。

Under the reaserch framework of the new standard of value decline of assets and on the basis of corporate governance theory,this study gives emprical analysis of the relationship between the companies's corporate governance features,Earnings Management motives and the reversal of long-lives assets on China's securities markets.In this paper ,using Corporate in China's capital market from 2001 to 2004 as a sample,my empirical study investigates on four conclutions .firstly,the integration of the Board and the General Manager ,the weakening competitiveness of manages'pay ,not setting up the independent audit committee,the Corporates which have these three features are inclined to revers the value decline of long-lived assets for earnings manage motives.Secondly,the couporates which have the reducing losses motives and share-rationing motives are inclined to revers the value decline of long-lived assets.meanwhile,the couporates which have the cleanning up motives and profits smoothing motives are not inclined to revers the value decline of long-lived assets.The third,future earnings capacity and economic environment does not affect the reversal of value decline of Long-lived assets.This paper finally provides some suggestions for the also the economic management Governments,the regulators on China's capital market,stakeholders and managers.