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基于博弈学习理论的企业组织模式演化动态 被引量:7

Evolutionary Dynamics for the Firm's Organizational Mode based on the Theory of Learning in Games
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摘要 应用博弈学习理论研究企业组织模式的演化动态.假定企业具有有限理性以及近视眼行为,企业选择某一组织模式的概率依赖于其自身偏好及该组织模式对应的市场份额,考虑到企业的进入行为,建立了单种群演化动态及适应性学习算法,分析了利润函数的性质对演化均衡的显著影响.在此基础上,以企业群体内部和企业群体之间的溢出效应为出发点,建立了两种群演化动态并研究了演化均衡和吸引域的变化.理论分析和数值模拟充分表明,从长期来看,企业组织模式的演化均衡结果取决于溢出效应的大小. The evolutionary dynamics for the firm' s organizational mode are studied by the theory of learning in games. The firms are assumed to be bounded rationality and myopia, and they choose the organizational mode in terms of their own preferences and the market share of the organizational mode. The evolutionary dynamics and the adaptive learning algorithm are presented by considering entry of the firm. It is demonstrated that the profit function greatly impact on the evolutionary equilibria. Based on the internal and the external spiUover effect of two populations, the corresponding evolutionary dynamics is developed to study the evolutionary equilibria and basins of attraction of equilibria. Theoretical analysis and numerical examples show that the evolutionary equilibria for the firm's organizational mode depend on the spiUover effect from the perspective of long run.
出处 《系统工程理论与实践》 EI CSCD 北大核心 2007年第6期64-70,共7页 Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
基金 国家自然科学基金(70301014 70571034 70671055) 教育部哲学社会科学创新基地"南京大学经济转型和发展研究中心"子课题"复杂经济系统演化研究" 江苏省高校哲学社会科学研究项目(06SJB630008)
关键词 组织模式 演化动态 演化均衡 溢出效应 organizational mode evolutionary dynamics evolutionary equilibrium spillover effect
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参考文献11

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