摘要
论文分析了政府投资工程委托代建管理模式下信息不对称的特征及其信息模型,对政府投资工程委托代建主体信息不对称情况进行了研究,重点分析了政府委托方、使用单位和代建单位之间的信息优势与信息劣势。建立了政府主管部门与代建单位和使用单位之间的不完全信息动态博弈模型,对政府投资工程委托代建主体行为进行了博弈分析。
In this paper the features of information asymmetry and information model under the model of management by construction agency in project invested by government are analyzed, the information asymmetry in the main bodies of construction agency in the project invested by government is studied. Especially the advantages and weaknesses in information among government consignor, consuming unit and construction agency are analyzed. A dynamic model of incomplete information among government consignor, consuming unit and construction agency has been set up,a game theory analysis on the actions about the main bodies of construction agency in the project invested by government is carried out.
出处
《重庆建筑大学学报》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2007年第3期141-144,共4页
Journal of Chongqing Jianzhu University
基金
湖北省建设厅建设科技项目资助(K200566)
关键词
政府投资工程
代建管理
信息不对称
博弈分析
project invested by government
management of construction agency
information asymmetry
Game Theory analysis