经营者股权激励与公司风险的模型研究

Study of model of manager stock option incentive and firm risk

考察了公司不同种类风险与经营者股权激励强度的关系.通过模型推导得出,当经营者不能买卖公司以外的市场证券组合时,经营者最优股权激励强度与公司非系统风险成反向变化关系,而与公司系统风险的相关关系不确定;当经营者能买卖公司以外市场证券组合时,经营者最优股权激励强度与公司非系统风险成反向变化,与公司系统风险无关,这为实践中经营者股权激励合同的设计进一步提供理论指导.

The relation between managers＇ stock option incentive intensity and their firms＇ risk characteristic is explored. The paper results from model and draws the conclusion that managers can not trade the market portfolio, optimal stock option incentive intensity decreases with increasing of firms＇ nonsystematic risk but is ambiguously affected by firms＇ systematic risk; when managers can trade the market portfolio, the optimal stock option incentive intensity decreases with firms＇ nonsystematic risk but is not affected by systematic risk. That provides managers with a theoretical direction of design of payment contract in practice.