摘要
经理人股票期权,作为对经理人实行的一种长期激励机制,是一种管理制度上的创新,从非对称信息博弈理论来分析经理人股票期权的产生及存在的意义,有助于深入理解经理人股票期权的理论背景及作用.
Executive Stock Option, as a kind of long- term incentive mechanism to general managers is an innovation of control system. This article analyzes the generation and existing meaning of Executive Stock Option from games with asymmetrical information. It helps to understand thoroughly the theory background and function of Executive Stock Option.
出处
《平顶山学院学报》
2007年第2期24-26,共3页
Journal of Pingdingshan University
关键词
经理人
股票期权
契约
非对称信息博弈
general manager
stock option
contract
games with asymmetrical information
