中国地方官员经济行为的效率分析——兼谈官员内在激励的重要性

Study on the Efficiency of Chinese Local Officials in Economic Activities——discussion on the importance of official intrinsic incentive

中国地方官员经济行为效率缺乏是一个有目共睹的问题,其原因在于官员外在激励的有效性缺乏。而这种缺乏是由政治委托代理关系的特点决定的:一是由于激励具有财政约束,限制了货币报酬激励,而非货币报酬激励的运用导致了代理人经济行为的政治目的,从而引起了激励有效性缺乏。二是由于委托人目标难确定和代理人产出难评价,使得官员能够很容易的通过经济行为实现政治目的。如果使委托人目标确定和代理人产出评价容易,则又会出现委托人目标片面和代理人产出评价简单的问题,从而降低激励的有效性。因此在政治委托代理关系中官员的内在激励非常重要。

Lack of efficiency in economic activities is a common phenomenon for China local authority officials. Lack of validity in external incentive to officials is a dominant factor. This can be contributed to the character of political trust agent relation in China. First, the financial restriction of incentive constrains the monetary compensation, and the operation of non-monetary incentive causes the political objective of agent economic activities, which results in the lack of incentive validity. Second, the difficulty in determining the objective of trustee and evaluating the performance of agent makes the officials easy to realize their political objective in the economic activities. If the objective and performance were easy to be determined, it would lead to a unilateral or simple appraisal simple, which would reduce the validity of the incentive. Therefore official＇s intrinsic incentive is extremely imoortant.