摘要
金融风险可以划分为商业性金融风险和制度性金融风险。制度性金融风险是我国银行业面临的最主要风险,因此银行监管激励相容度是更适合我国国情的概念。在银行发展史上,呈现出两种迥异的银行成长模式:一种是资金约束型的数量成长模式;一种是资本约束型的质量成长模式,资本约束型的质量成长模式是商业银行的必然选择。资本约束机制与激励相容机制共同发挥作用是银行监管激励与约束机制有效运作的必要条件。激励相容和资本约束要以监管绩效为基础协调发挥作用、不可分割。资本约束与激励相容理念不仅体现在理论研究中,而且体现在国际银行业监管实践中。
Financial risks can be classified into commercial financial risk and institutional financial risk with the latter being the major risk faced by our banking industry. Therefore, banking supervision and incentive compatibility suit better China's specific conditions. In the history of banking development, there are two dimensionally different modes of banking growth: one is the capital-restrained quantitative mode and the other is the capital-restrained qualitative mode, which is a must choice by commercial banks. Co-functioning of capital restraint and incentive compatibility mechanism serves as a requisite for effective adoption of banking su-pervision incentive and restraint mechanism. Incentive compatibility and capital restraint should be coordinated rather than separated when supervisory performance is considered. The concept of capital restraint and incentive compatibility exists not only in theory but also in the practice of international banking supervision.
出处
《金融论坛》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第5期19-25,共7页
Finance Forum
关键词
激励相容
资本约束
巴塞尔协议
制度性金融风险
incentive compatibility
capital restraint
Basle Accord
systemic financial risk