基于公务员监督的混合战略博弈分析

Research on Surveillance Mechanism of Civil Servants Based on Mixed Strategy Combat

以委托—代理理论和信息经济学中的监督模型为基础,通过对政府和公务员二者在完全信息静态博弈下的混合战略分析可见,租金的高低、政府监督的成本和对寻租的公务员惩罚的力度是影响公务员寻租的三个主要因素。我们应通过健全社会舆论与群众监督机制,提高公务员的道德水平,加大对公务员寻租行为的法制惩罚力度,加大对寻租者的物质惩罚力度,健全社会主义市场经济体制,消除租源等措施来防止公务员寻租。

Based on principal-agent theory and surveillance model in information economics, through an analysis of the mixed strategies between government and civil servants under complete information static combat, we can see that highness of rent, cost of government surveillance and severity of punishment on rent-seeking civil servants are three main factors that influence civil servants＇rent seeking. We should take such measures to prevent them from seeking rent as improving social opinion system and public surveillance system, enhancing civil servants＇ moral level, increasing severity of legal punishment on civil servants＇ rent seeking and severity of material punishment on rent-seekers, improving socialist market economy system, and eliminating rent sources.