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社会保障基金投资管理的博弈分析 被引量:1

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摘要 本文分析了投资管理双方行为主体间在一次博弈、重复博弈和不完全信息动态博弈下的战略选择表明,在投资管理人和委托人类型不确定的情况下,他们会因为重视自身声誉的塑造而在有限期的重复博弈中实现相互合作。
出处 《价格月刊》 北大核心 2007年第1期66-68,共3页
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