摘要
本文首先回顾关于供应链合作的国内外研究,然后利用委托—代理理论建立了一个在需求依赖于销售商努力水平下的供应链激励模型,对这个模型的分析和研究后得出制造商对销售商的最优激励机制,这个机制为制造商以一个比成本稍高的价格把产品批发给销售商,在销售商卖出产品后,从利润中拿出一部分返还制造商,并且证明了这个机制能使双方和供应链都达到最优。
This paper first looks back to the domestic and international research concerning the supply chain. Then building on principal-agent theory, it establishes an incentive model. By analyzing and studying the model, it obtains the optimal mechanism for the incentive of manufacturers to sellers. Finally, it proves that the mechanism can make the supply chain optimal.
关键词
供应链
需求不确定
委托-代理理论
最优化
Supply chain
Demand indetermination
Principal-agent theory
Optimal
