非对称谈判能力对双边投资激励的影响

The Influence of Bilateral Investment Incentive by the Unsymmetrical Bargaining Power

由于企业合作中双方谈判力量的不同,导致双方在合作剩余中的分配份额是非对称的,而分配份额直接决定了投资激励的大小。研究了企业合作中不同谈判力量对比对合作收益分配模式的影响,并通过建立一般的数学模型研究不同支付模式下双方的最优投资,通过与社会最优投资进行比较,分析收益分配方式对双边投资激励造成的影响及其原因。

Because the collaboration enterprises had different bargaining power, the allocation shares of the collaboration surplus were unsymmetrical. So the bilateral investments in the collaboration were influenced by the bargaining power dejectedly. The paper studied how the bargaining power influenced the collaboration allocation modes in collaboration contract. And then studied the optimization of the bilateral investment incentive through setting up general mathematic models. By comparing with the social optimization investment, the paper also studied the disadvantages of different modes and the causation.