企业政治行为的非对称博弈分析

An Asymmetrical Game Analysis of Corporate Political Activity

通过建立非对称博弈模型研究了企业政治行为.从离散博弈模型来看,企业政治行为是典型的囚徒困境问题.从连续非对称博弈模型来看,企业相对规模在政企关系上起着重要作用,当企业规模较大时,企业易引起地方政府的重视,企业与地方政府之间的关系相对比较密切,在稀缺资源分配时处于有利地位;当地方政府倾向于用行政手段配置资源时,企业会选择高关系,企业政治行为趋向明显;当公关成本过高时,政治行为投资风险上升,企业会谨慎选择政治行为;增加腐败的机会成本,有助于抑制企业政治行为.

Corporate activities under the asymmetrical game model are analyzed. From the discrete game model, it is found that political activities are typical Prisoner＇ s Dilemma. From the continuous asymmetrical game, it is found the relative scale of the corporation plays an important role in its relationship with the government. The results suggest the following： firstly, when the corporation has a large scale, it is easier to gain the attention and make a closer relationship with government, and easier to obtain limited resources; secondly, when the local government prefers administrative power to collocate resources, the corporation will choose closer relationship with the government and prefer more enterprise political activities; lastly, when the maintaining cost is too high, the risk of political activities investment will arise, and the corporation will be more cautious in choosing political activities in investment. This implies increasing corruption cost can restrain corporate political activities.