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跨国银行监管理论的新进展

Review on the Latest Development of the Multinational Banking Supervision Theory
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摘要 金融市场的统一趋势及其监管范围的不断扩展,引发了银行监管的国际协调问题。跨国银行主要以分行或子行的形式开展国际业务,组织结构的差异同时带来了银行监管方面的差异。本文探讨了跨国银行监管与组织结构的关系,并对国际上关于跨国银行监管理论的最新研究成果进行了综述。随着我国银行业的全面对外开放,跨国银行监管会越来越凸显其重要的现实意义。 The international coordination of banking supervision arises from the trends of continuous expansion and unification of the financial markets. Multinational banks operated mainly by branches or subsidiaries. The difference in the organizational structure of the banking brought about the difference in banking supervision. This article reviewed the latest research results on the multinational bank supervision, with a focus on the relationship between the organization and the supervision. With China's banking industry going to the outside world, multinational bank supervision is becoming more and more important.
出处 《世界经济研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2007年第6期38-43,共6页 World Economy Studies
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参考文献10

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