上市公司并购定价博弈模型

Pricing-Game Model for Listed Firm Merger and Acquisition

通过将经典的Nash讨价还价模型运用于股权分置问题解决后中国上市公司股权并购定价的博弈分析,可以发现在完全信息、理性预期假设以及不引入并购市场竞争因素的条件下,有限期、无限期或无固定期谈判情况下的并购双方机会成本、持股比例以及控股所需比例等因素对交易价格的影响,并获得解析结果。

This author employs Nash＇s classical bargain model in pricing-game analysis for the merger and acquisition of listed firms in China after the solution of stock sharing, discusses opportunity costs, share-hold ratio and share-control ratio in the finite period, infinite period and non-fixed period negotiation situations respectively and comes to a conclusion.