摘要
从新制度主义理论的角度看来,司法腐败是基于激励机制的扭曲、机会结构的畸形发展和约束结构的软化等制度性原因所造成。司法独立的内涵很丰富,但是在制度架构上包括法院独立、法官独立、审级独立三个方面。司法独立对于形成司法腐败的机会结构缺陷有较好的矫正作用,但是对于激励机制和约束结构等方面的制度缺陷的匡正作用并不是很明显,因此司法独立对于遏制司法腐败具有一定作用,但是其作用也不能高估。
Judged from the perspective of neo-institutionalism, judicial corruption is the result of institutional reasons such as the distortion of stimulation mechanism, the abnormal development of opportunity structure and the weakness of supervision structure. Judicial independence is intensive. Institutionally, it includes three aspects, that is, the independence of courts, of judges, and of trial stages. Judicial independence has the function of rectifying the deficiency of opportunity structure which leads to corruption. However, it is not very effective in rectifying the institutional deficiency in the stimulation system and the supervision structure. Thus, to some extend, judicial independence can prevent judicial corruption. But its function should not be overestimated.
出处
《温州大学学报(社会科学版)》
2007年第4期44-49,共6页
Journal of Wenzhou University:Social Science Edition
关键词
新制度主义
司法独立
司法腐败
遏制
Neo-institutionalism
Judicial independence
Juridical corruption
Prevention