中国上市公司董事会独立性与监督效率关系实证研究

An Empirical Study of the Relationship between Board Independence and Supervision Efficiency in Chinese Listed Companies

董事会的事前与事中监督相对监事会的事后监督,更有利于风险的规避与代理成本的降低,而独立性是决定董事会监督效率的关键。采用非参数检验以及多元统计分析对我国上市公司董事会的独立性与其监督效率的关系进行的实证分析显示我国上市公司独立董事比例与监督效率没有直接的关系;董事长与总经理的两职分设有助于制衡效率的提升;独立性差与提名机制不合理,是制约董事会监督效率有效发挥的关键;由于独立性差使审计委员会没有对提升董事会监督效率产生积极的作用;法人股股东较国有股股东具有更高的监督积极性和监督能力;债务约束有助于关联交易的规范和信息披露质量的改善,但负债比例过高会诱使上市公司发生舞弊行为。

Board supervision in advance and in-process is more advantageous to risk avoidance and agency cost reduction compared with supervision afterward, and the independence of board is the key factor determining board supervision efficiency. We have done systematic empirical research studies of the relationship between board independence and supervision efficiency in Chinese listed companies by nonparametric test and multivariate statistical analysis in this paper. We find that the proportion of independent directors and supervision efficiency are not directly related, separation of the CEO and board chairman helps to improve check-and-balance efficiency, that the nominating mechanism of board members is unreasonable and this is the key factor restricting the effective supervising function of the board, that the degree of independence of audit committee plays a positive role in promoting board supervision efficiency, that corporation shareholders have higher supervision enthusiasm and ability compared with state shareholders, and that debt restraint is helpful to standardize connected transaction and improve the quality of information disclosure, but excessively high debt proportion can inccur Fraudulent behavior.