《自然辩证法》的“人”:生态伦理学的人学本体论

“Human” in “Nature Dialectics”:the Human Ontology of Ecological Ethics

在《自然辩证法》中,恩格斯从自然和历史两个维度对人的本质进行了科学而辩证的解读。从自然的维度看,人是“蛋白体的存在方式”,与非人类的生命具有同质性,是“小写”的人,因而伦理学应该走出对人的“固恋”,“扩大道德共同体的边界”,把自然纳入伦理的怀抱。从历史的维度看,人是劳动的产物,是对象化活动中的自我生成,是“大写”的人;劳动的对象性决定了人与自然的“场依存性”,决定了人把自然作为“道德顾客”的逻辑必然性。这样,恩格斯对人的本质规定性的理解,既超越了非人类中心主义的“自然人”,又超越了人类中心主义的“理性人”;它为生态伦理学的成立提供了充分的“本体论证明”。

In Nature Dialectics, Enges made scientific and dialectic interpretation of human nature from the perspective of nature and history. From the perspective of nature, human is the ＂existence of protein＂, sharing the same features with non-human beings, and that is the superficial meaning of ＂human＂. Ethics, therefore, should go beyond the ＂focused attention＂ to human beings and ＂expand the limit of moral community＂, involving nature in it. From the perspective of history, human is the product of labor, and the self-production of human＇s activities of recognizing and changing the world. That is the deeper meaning of ＂human＂. The fact that labor involves objects decides the interdependent relationship between human and nature, which makes human view nature as ＂ moral client＂ inevitably in logic. In this way, Enges interpretation of human nature goes beyond not only the ＂ natural human＂ of non-anthropocentrism, but also the ＂ rational human＂ of anthropocentrism, which provides ecological ethics with sufficient ＂ontological ground＂.