期刊文献+

保险市场私有信息理论评述 被引量:2

On the Private Information Theory of the Insurance Market
原文传递
导出
摘要 私有信息是保险市场研究中不能回避的命题,在文献回顾的基础上,本文分析了保险市场私有信息研究脉络:古典经济学假设完全信息,因此不可能成为保险私有信息研究的基石;随着信息经济学的兴起,历史文献多认为私有信息损害保险市场效率;近期相关文献在残差信息估计和多维算法的基础上提出被保险人对未来风险同样是未知的,因此被保险方风险偏好、财富状况才是影响保险市场均衡的决定因素。 Private information is a topic unavoidable in research on the insurance market. Based on a review of relevant literature, the paper made an analysis on research about insurance market private information, Classic economics assumes full information, therefore it cannot be the foundation for the study on insurance market private information, Along with the advent of the information economics, historical literature tends to argue that private information undermines insurance market efficiency. Some recent literature holds, on the basis of fragmental information estimates and multidimensional calculation, that the insured is equally ignorant of future risks, therefore his or her risk preference and wealth status are determinants on equilibrium of the insurance market.
作者 谢志斌
出处 《保险研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2007年第7期22-24,29,共4页 Insurance Studies
关键词 保险学 私有信息 保险市场均衡 insurance private information the equilibrium of insurance market
  • 相关文献

参考文献16

  • 1Akerlof.“The Market for Lemons : Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism”. Quarterly Jouranl of Economics, 1970.89:488 - 500.
  • 2Arrow. " Political and Economic Evaluation of Social Effects and Externalities" New York: Cilimbia University press, 1970.
  • 3Borch. " Equilibrium in Reinsurance Market", Econometrica, 1962.7:424 -444.
  • 4Chiappori. “Empirical Contract Theory:The Case of Insurance data”,European Economics Review, 1997.41:943 - 950.
  • 5Finkelstein. “Multiple Dimensions of Private Informaion: Evidence from the Long -Term Care Insurance Market”, American economics reviews ,2006.4:939 - 955.
  • 6Harris. "Some Results on Incentive Contracts with Applications to Education and Employment, Health Insurance, and Law Enforcement" ,The American Economic Review, 1978.68:20 - 30.
  • 7Micheal. " Regulating Genetic Information in Insurance Markets", Risk Management and Insurance Review,2005.8:211 - 237.
  • 8Mossion. "Aspects of Rational Insurance Purchasing", Journal of Political Economy, 1968.79:553 - 569.
  • 9Pauly. “Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: the Role of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection”, Quarterly Jouranl of Economics, 1974.68:44 - 62.
  • 10Puelz.“Ecidence on Adverse Selection :Equilibrium Signaling and Cross-subsidization in the Insurance Market”, Journal of Political Economy, 1994.2:236 - 257.

二级参考文献38

  • 1Mayers D and C.W.Smith, 1988,"Ownership Sructure Across Lines of Property-casualty Insurance," Journal of Law and Economics ,63,19-40.
  • 2Mookerjee, D. and Png, I., 1989, "Optimal Auditing, Insurance and Redistribution," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104,205-228.
  • 3Meier, Kenneth J., 1988, The Political Economy of Regulation : The Case of Insurance, Albany, NY : State University of New York Press.
  • 4Mossin,J., 1968, "Aspects of Rational Insurance Purchasing, "Journal of Political Economy ,79,553-568.
  • 5Neumann,J.Von and O. Morgenstem, 1947, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton University Press.
  • 6Pratt,J., 1964,"Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large", Econometrica,32,122-136.
  • 7Rothchild, M. and J. E. Stiglitz, 1976," Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets:The Economics of Markets With Imperfect Information,"Quarterly Journal of Economics ,90,629-650.
  • 8Rubinstein, A and M. E. Yaari, 1983," Repeated Insurance Contracts and Moral Hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, 30,74-97.
  • 9Shavell, S., 1986," The Judgement Proof Problem ,"International Review of Law and Economics,6,45-58.
  • 10Spence, M. and R. Zeckhauser , 1971 ," Insurance, Information and Individual Action ," American Economic Review,61,380-387.

共引文献46

同被引文献17

  • 1杨栋,郭玉清.指令驱动型市场、非公开信息与中国证券收益率[J].南开经济研究,2007(4):106-117. 被引量:2
  • 2HEALY P M, HUTFON A P, PALEPU K G. Stock performance and intermediation changes surrounding sustained increases in disclosure [ J ]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 1999,16 ( 3 ) :485 - 520.
  • 3GROSSMAN S J, Hart O D. An analysis of the principal - agent problem [ J ]. Econometrica, 1983,51 ( 1 ) : 7 - 45.
  • 4BORCH K. Equilibrium in a reinsurance market [ J ]. Econometrica, 1962,30 ( 3 ) :424 - 444.
  • 5MOSSION J. Aspects of rational insurance purchasing [ J ]. Journal of Political Economy, 1968,76 (4) : 553 - 568.
  • 6ARROW K J. Insurance,risk and resource allocation in aspects of the theory of risk-bearing[ R]. working paper, 1965.
  • 7PAULY M V. Overinsurance and public provision of insurance:The roles of adverse selection and moral hazard [ J ]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1974,88 ( 1 ) :44 - 62.
  • 8ROTHSCHILD M, STIGLITZ J. Equilibrium in competitive insurance market: An essay on the economics of imperfect information [ J ]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1976,90 (4) : 629 - 649.
  • 9HARRIS M, RAVIV A. Some results on incentive contracts with applications to education and employment, health insurance, and law enforcement [ J ]. American Economic Review, 1978,68 ( 1 ) : 20 - 30.
  • 10AKERLOF G A. The market for "Lemons" : Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism [ J ]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1970,84(3) :488 -500.

引证文献2

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部