摘要
中国地方官员经济竞争效率低下的原因运用激励理论从官员经济竞争的目的可以得到一种解答。由于官员外在激励的条件不具备,结果扭曲了官员的行为目的和行为选择,表现在:一是激励报酬缺乏,导致了代理人经济竞争的政治目的。二是业绩考核欠准,为官员通过经济竞争实现政治目的提供了条件。官员激励条件欠缺也造成外在激励的有效性缺乏,由此也突出了官员的内在激励的重要性。
The economic activities of China local authority are lacking in efficiency. The reason lies in the political purpose of offical＇s economic competition, which is lacking the monetary pay off incentive so that has caused the political purpose of agent＇ s economic competition. The other reason is the performance examination is not accurate enough, and it offers the condition for officals.to realize their political purposes. The external incentive of the official is invalid because the condition of the offical＇ s incentive is deficient, therefore, perfecting the official＇ s intrinsic incentive is extremely important.
出处
《青岛科技大学学报（社会科学版）》
2007年第2期68-73,共6页
Journal of Qingdao University of Science and Technology(Social Sciences)
关键词
官员
竞争
效率
officals
competition
efficiency
