民间环保组织在非营利组织视角下的委托代理博弈分析

The agency-principal game analyses of non-governmental environmental protection organizations from the viewpoint of non-profit organization

从非营利组织的视角研究民间环保组织的绩效问题,为管理者提供建议.用非营利组织的理论和博弈模型分析在多委托人情况下制度约束对民间环保组织绩效的影响.民间环保组织的委托代理模型中,在多委托人监督时,组织的非分配性约束加剧委托人监督搭便车的动机,约束条件越紧,委托人在监督中越易搭便车,不利于组织绩效;行政主管部门提供的监督努力水平取决于法律的界定.应采取措施改变约束条件或者改进激励方式,以减少组织委托人在监督代理人中的搭便车行为;从完善立法、吸引社会关注、完善自身组织等方面着手来提高民间环保组织的绩效.

From the angle of non-profit organization, the performance of non-governmental environmental protection organizations was studied for providing suggestions to mangers. The theory of non-profit organization and game model were used to analyge the influence of system restriction to the performance of non-governmental environmental protection organizations when there are multi-principals. In the agency-principal model of non-governmental environmental protection organizations, the non-distribution restrictions would enhance the principals＇ hitchhiking behavior in supervising the attorneys and impair the performance of organizations. The supervising effort of the government in charge is generally deter- mined by the law concerned. The restrictions and inspiring methods should be promoted to reduce the principals＇ hitchhiking behavior and measures should be taken for improving the related law, attracting social interest,and improving the organization to promote performances of non-governmental environmental protection organizations.