2Beasley, M, , 1996. An Empirical Investigation of the Relation between Board of Director Composition and Financial Statement Fraud. Accounting Review71, 443--460.
3Bell, T. , Szykowny, S. , Willingham, J. , 1991. Assessing the Likelihood of Fraudulent Financial Reporting: A Cascaded Logit Approach. Working Paper, KPMG.
4Coughlan, A, , Schmidt, R. , 1985. Executive Compensation, Management Turnover and Firm Performance. Journal of Accounting and Economics 7, 43--66.
5Denis, D. , Serrano, J. , 1996. Active Investors and the Management Turnover Following Unsuccessful Control Contest. Journal of Financial Economics45, 193-- 221.
6Fama, E. , 1980. Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm. Journal of Political Economy 88, 288--307.
7Fama, E. , Jensen, M. , 1983. Separation of Ownership and Control. Journal of Law, and Economics 26,327--349.
8Franks, J. , Mayer, C. , 2001. The Ownership and Control of German Corporations. Review of Financial Studiesl4, 943 -- 977.
9Gomes, A. , Noveas, W. , 2001. Sharing of Control as a Corporate Governance Mechanism. Wharton School of University of Pennsylvania, Working paper.
10Grossman, S. , Hart, O. , 1986. The Cost and Benefits of Ownership:A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration. Journal of Political Economy 94, 691-- 719.
