摘要
本文构建了一个简单的演化博弈模型,刻画了参与多哈回合实质谈判的少数几个跨国集团联盟在多边贸易谈判过程中的一些行为特征。本文认为,如果各方对农业利益持有零和博弈的观点,那么随着时间的推移,各谈判集团中持强硬谈判策略的官员会逐渐增多,最终容易导致谈判不断出现僵局。多哈回合谈判的前景的改善,依赖于各方改变对农业利益看法的重商主义态度。
This paper constructs an evolutionary game theoretical model to capture the features of multilateral negotiation. This paper argues that the zero-sum-game point of view of mercantilism played a key role in the deadlock of Doha Round, as far as the international trade is concerned. The equilbrium shows that in the end negotiators could come to consensus. The zero-sum-game of viewpoint on international trade also cuold lead the bilateral negotiation and regional mulilateral negotiation to a failure. Therefore, the resuming of Doha Round and consensus heavily depend on the change of viewpoint of the negotiators.
出处
《世界经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第7期47-51,共5页
World Economy Studies
