默会合作

Tacit Cooperation

认为默会合作具有规则模糊性、高度的主体相关性、双重性、决策分散性等特点;同时,企业的合作动机不仅来自于互惠从属关系或者避免相互报复,还来自于对总体利益的关注.因此,引入虚拟局中人以体现总体利润的多少,同时提出偏好弃利和η-平衡决策束的概念,并研究了弃利向量集的结构.结果发现在一定条件下企业的弃利向量集是凸集,而且在合作企业的偏好弃利具有不变权重的条件下,系统存在唯一的最小弃利点,以达成或维持默会合作.

Besides formal cooperation which depends on ex ante communications, firms can cooperate unformally through tacit understanding and agreement on social norms, culture, values, and beliefs etc. Tacit cooperation have four signlcaficant characters： fuzzy behavior patterns, high dependence on subjects, duality, and decision decentralization. This paper shows that cooperative incentives come from not only reciprocal subordination （or the avoidance of reciprocal retaliation）, but also the concern about the totalprofits. Therefore, a virtual player whose utility is the total profits is introduced. Furthermore, the contributive preferences to collaboration and the η-balanced strategic bundle are defined. By studying on the structure of the set of the contributive preferences to collaboration, we show that the set of firms＇ contributive preferences to collaboration is convex. Under some conditions, all of the optimal contributive oreferences to collaboration must be in the same isometric suoer-surface of a convex function.