理性的无知与新古典的社会契约维系

Rational Ignorance and Maintenance of Neo Classical Model under Social Contracts

新古典经济学体系由于其完备理性的假定,遭到了广泛的质疑。本文从有限理性出发,通过对理性的无知和社会契约的分析,提出社会契约保证下的理性的无知也可以达到新古典的结果,从而尝试了一种对新古典模型维系的新的思路。

New Classical Economics was confronted with more and more distrusts for its consumption of consummated - rationality. In the article, the author points out, after analyses of bounded rationality, rational ignorance and social contracts, that rational ignorance, which is under the assurance of social contracts, can also lead to the New Classical results. The author wants to try a new path to maintain the Neo Classical models.