摘要
由于历史方面的原因,转轨经济中的银行监管具有某些特殊性,这些特殊性表现在市场结构、监管体制和监管者偏好等方面,同时也决定了转轨经济中的最优监管策略可能有别于发达国家所面临的情形,尤其是当监管者存在自利倾向时,监管行为可能偏离社会福利最大化的目标,偏离的程度受到交替关系临界值、声誉权重、审查成本和社会福利权重等因素的影响。
As one of the historical heritages of central-planned economy, bank regulation in transition economies is somewhat special. These special characteristics, which make the optimal bank regulation different from those exercised in developed economies, may exist in banking industry structure, regulatory system, regulators＇ preferences, etc. Moreover, if the regulators have a self-interest preference, then the regulatory action may deviate from the maximization of social welfare and the extent of deviation is connected with 4 variables as defined in this paper.
出处
《经济理论与经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第7期19-25,共7页
Economic Theory and Business Management
基金
教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目"现代金融体系下银行混业经营的风险与监管体系"(05JJD970027)
关键词
转轨经济
监管代理关系
监管者自利
transition economy
agency relationship
self-interested regulation
