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政府声誉与采矿权价值 被引量:3

Government reputation and the value of mining rights
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摘要 竞得的采矿权可能受到政府的侵犯,增加了竞拍人所面临的不确定性,减少了被拍卖的采矿权对竞拍人的价值,降低了政府拍卖矿业权的期望收益。要改变这种“双输”的结果,政府保护采矿权的承诺必须可信。而要政府的承诺可信,只能使政府侵犯产权的专断权力受到政治和法律等制度的有效制约,或者政府从自身利益考虑,建立不侵害采矿权的声誉。若政府在出让采矿权时更多地采取拍卖的方式,则其更有激励建立声誉。 Government' s infringing on mining rights enhances the uncertainty the bidders will face, reduces the value of the auctioned mining rights, and cuts down the expected revenue of governments. In order to change this situation, government's commitments of protecting mining rights must be credible. Only if government's powers of infringing property rights have been limited strictly by political and legal systems or governments have set up reputations of protecting mining rights are the government's commitments credible. The more governments adopt the way of auction when they transfer mining rights, the more they are impelled to set up reputations.
作者 晏波 安琼伟
出处 《中国矿业》 北大核心 2007年第7期21-23,27,共4页 China Mining Magazine
关键词 采矿权 拍卖 法治 声誉 mining rights auction rule of taw reputation
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共引文献94

同被引文献17

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