摘要
目前,解决农村公共产品的供给困境已成为农村发展的关键。鉴于农村公共产品主要还是由政府提供,在委托——代理的理论框架下,根据委托与代理之间的利益差别性以及个体追求利益最大化的理性导致集体行为非理性的理论预设,文章从多元利益博弈的角度,对政府(中央政府和地方政府)与农民在农村公共产品供给中基于各自的理性选择却导致非合作博弈的困局进行解读,并提出正和博弈的有效治理途径。
Currently, problems existing in the supplying of public goods in rural areas have become the main obstacle to the development of these areas. Since the public goods in rural areas of China are still provided mainly by government, this article tries to examine these problems under the theory of Principal-Agent. According to this theory, the different benefits between principal & agent and the individual intention to pursue largest benefits would lead to the irrational collective action. Similarly, in the process of supplying public goods in rural areas in China, the respective rational choice of the government (central and local government) and individual farmer inevitably lead to the result of discordance. Here in this article, the author believes Positive-Sum Game should be the efficient way to solve these problems.
出处
《桂海论丛》
2007年第4期48-50,共3页
Guihai Tribune
关键词
农村公共产品
委托代理
多元利益博弈
正和博弈
public goods in rural areas
the Principal-Agent Relation
the game between diverse benefits
the positive-sum game