股权结构与代理问题

代理问题是公司治理研究的核心内容。在20世纪早期的公司治理研究中,人们普遍认为现代公司的股权结构是高度分散的,公司的控制权掌握在经营者手中,所有权与控制权完全分离,所有者与经营者之间的利益冲突被视为公司最关键的代理问题。然而,近年来的研究发现,世界上大多数国家的公司股权不是高度分散,而是相当集中的,公司控制权实际上掌握在控股股东手中,公司的控股股东对中小股东的掠夺才是现代公司最核心的代理问题。

Agency problem is the core content of corporate governance researeh. In the early time of the 20th century, most researches on corporate governance suggest that the ownership structure of modem corporations are highly dispersive, and the controlling right of corporations are in the hands of the managements, so the conflicts of interest between the owners and managements is regarded as the key agency problem of modem corporations. However, in recent years, many researchers find that in most countries of the world, corporate ownerships are not highly dispersive, but are quite centralized. As a result, the controlling right of corporations are in the hands of controlling owners, and controlling shareholders＇ expropriating other small shareholders is the key agency problem.