增强信息透明度能否提升公司价值? 被引量：19

Dose Transparency Increase Firm's Value?

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摘要为揭示上市公司信息透明度与公司价值之间的内在关联,本文应用信息经济学构建上市公司信息披露的"声誉投资"模型,对信息披露程度提高对公司价值提升进行理论推理,论证"好"公司为避免"次品车"效应造成的"价值折价",有动力进行多披露信息。为验证上市公司增加信息披露提升公司价值,本文利用托宾q对2002-2003年中国证券市场数据进行实证分析。通过对研究样本实证检验,结果显示托宾q与公司信息披露增量之间显著正相关,采取积极信息披露策略的上市公司市场价值相应较高;而信息供给程度低的上市公司市场价值相应较低。 In order to find out the intrinsic correlation between information disclosure and corporate value, we construct the reputation investment models based on information economics. To test the hypothesis that listed firms can increase the firm＇s value by disclosing more information, we conduct the empirical study by employing Tobin＇ s q and data from China＇s security market. The results show that Tobin＇s q has a significantly positive relation with incremental information disclosure. The firms adopting active disclosure strategy have higher market value as compared with the firms with less information disclosure.

作者张宗新朱伟骅

机构地区复旦大学金融研究院复旦大学经济学院

出处《南方经济》北大核心 2007年第7期47-59,共13页 South China Journal of Economics

基金教育部人文社科基金项目"上市公司信息披露质量与投资者保护研究"(05JC790093) 国家社会科学基金研究项目"证券信息内幕交易行为及其规制研究"(06CJY038)

关键词信息透明度声誉投资公司价值 Transparence Firm＇ s Value Reputation Investment Model

分类号 F830.91 [经济管理—金融学]

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参考文献14

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