公司治理对高管报酬的调节效应分析——基于民营上市公司大股东控制、董事会监督的视角

Analysis on the Company's Adjustment the CEO's Remunation——From the Perspective of Shareholders Controling and Board Supervising in Private Listed Companies

文章以2006年深、沪两市的235家民营上市公司为样本,实证检验了大股东控制、董事会监督对民营上市公司高管报酬的调节效应。实证结果为:我国民营上市公司的公司绩效与高管报酬正相关,董事会监督的调节作用会强化二者正相关关系,但大股东控制的调节作用会扭曲二者的正相关关系。结论表明,在我国民营上市公司的报酬决定中存在"赎买效应"和"任职激励效应",加强对大股东控制的监管,推进董事会独立性的建设,对于提升我国民营上市公司的治理水平具有重要意义。

Taking 235 private listed cmpanies in Shenzhen and Shanghai as samples, the paper inspects the moderating effet on CEO＇s remunation in private listed companies by the great shareholders controling and board supervising. The results show that the company achievement is in direct ratio with the CEO＇ s remunation, which would be strengthened by the regulation of beard supervising. It proves that there are factors such as ＂redeeming effet＂ and ＂holding post inspiring effect＂ which would decide the reward in private listed companies. It is significant in advancing the governance level of the private listed companies to strengthen the supervising on the great shareholders control and the constructirlg on the beard independence.