国有资本流失的理论模型研究

Theoretical Model of State-owned Capital's Loss

我国的国有资本管理实行的是委托代理制,在这个委托代理链中可能导致国有资本流失的主体包括政府、政府官员、经营者和企业职工。防范国有资本流失的重点在于打破经营者与政府官员的合谋。通过官员、经营者合谋模型和国有资本监督供给模型的分析,得出了政府应分离国有资本经营职能;官员应退出国有资本的利益相关者主体;对经营者应从产品市场、资本市场、经理市场和内部治理等方面予以监督的结论。

The managing system of China state-owned capital is principal-agent. In the chain of principal-agent, the government, the governmental officials, managers and enterprises＇ staff are entities which may cause state-owned capital＇s loss. The key to prevent the conspiracy of managers and officials is to hit hard such malpractice. Through the analysis of the conspiracy model between officials and managers, and the state-owned capital＇s supervision supplying model, the conclusion is as follows： the government should separate the managing function of state-owned capital, officials should quit from the stakeholders of state-owned capital, and the supervision of managers should depend on product market, capital market, manager market and internal governance.