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公司治理和公司融资政策研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据 被引量:9

Research on Corporate Governance and Financing Policy——Empirical Evidences from Chinese Listed Companies
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摘要 本文采用中国非金融上市公司横截面数据,应用因子分析模型经验检查公司治理和公司融资政策之间关系。研究发现:(1)治理水平高的公司具有较高的负债水平,反之亦然;(2)总的说来,中国上市公司不能通过融资政策解决自由现金流问题,但可以通过提高公司治理水平减缓这一问题。 The paper examines empirically the the relationship between corporate governance and financing policy by adopting factor analysis model and cross-sectional data of Chinese non-financial listed companies. The study finds that: (1) the company that its governance level is higher will has a higher debt level, vice versa; (2) In general, Chinese listed companies do not resolve the free cash flow problem by financing policy, but the problem can be mitigated by improving corporate governance level.
作者 肖作平
出处 《管理工程学报》 CSSCI 2007年第3期60-66,149,共8页 Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70472048) 中国博士后科学基金资助项目(2005038065)
关键词 公司治理 融资政策 上市公司 经验证据 corporate governance financing policy listed companies empirical evidence
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参考文献24

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二级参考文献58

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