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投资者博弈对新股发行抑价率影响分析

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摘要 本文把申购新股的投资者分为两类:一类是机构投资者,另一类是个人投资者。通过在信息不对称理论的基础上采用博弈模型着重分析机构投资者和个人投资者行为,并由此分析其对新股发行抑价率的影响。最后,本文在此基础上指出单边市和市场投资品种的缺乏,使得我国在大力发展机构投资者的同时,要加强对投资者成熟投资理念的教育,避免市场非理性异常现象的发生。
作者 曾昭志
机构地区 华南师范大学
出处 《全国商情》 2007年第8期69-69,90,共2页
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