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可信计算环境下敏感信息流的安全控制 被引量:4

Secure control of sensitive information flow in trusted computing environment
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摘要 敏感或秘密信息被系统内部人员通过移动介质非法外泄是一个非常严重的现实安全问题。提出的SIFCM模型利用可信计算平台的硬件保护功能,对流出系统范围的敏感和秘密信息进行强制加密,并且保证信息在系统范围外是不可能被解密。SIFCM模型的核心是从物理上保证相关加密密钥不会流出系统范围之外,从而保证被保护信息的安全保密性。在满足信息安全保密的前提下,SIFCM的数据透明加解密机制同时也保证了用户终端系统的易用性和业务兼容性。 The illegal leakage of sensitive information by authorized people is a very serious and realistic security problem. A SIFCM model is presented to solve the problem by imperatively encrypting any sensitive information flowing out of the system and cannot be decrypted unless the information is back into the system. SIFCM model is based on the hardware protection capability of trusted computing, any key protected by the hardware security chip cannot be resolved outside so that the data encrypted by the key can be kept confidential. Besides the capability to protect sensitive information, SIFCM model can also keep the back compatibility of user system.
出处 《计算机工程与设计》 CSCD 北大核心 2007年第15期3569-3572,共4页 Computer Engineering and Design
基金 国家973重点基础研究发展计划基金项目(G1999035801)
关键词 可信计算 信息安全 数据加密 密钥管理 信息流控制 trusted computing information security cryptograph key management information flow control
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