期刊文献+

市场经济中大型公共建筑节能监管体系的政府规制及其创新 被引量:12

Government regulation and its innovation for large-scale public building energy efficiency supervision systems under market economy
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摘要 针对目前政府建筑节能管理职能缺失的情况,提出了政府建筑节能监管职能的变迁与再设计理念,重新定位了政府在建筑节能管理中的监管角色。应用规制经济学和现代管理学等相关学科理论,对各级政府在推进实施政府办公建筑和大型公共建筑节能监管体系中的具体作用及职责进行了分析研究,进一步明确了政府规制在节能监管体系中的重要作用。对市场经济条件下政府与政府办公建筑业主、公益性公共建筑业主、大型商业建筑业主、建筑节能服务机构之间以博弈为基本特征的互动机理进行了深入研究,对基于政府规制的大型公共建筑节能监管体系的顺利实施提出了应对策略,以使政府与其他相关主体逐步趋于利益共同体。 Aiming at the lack of government administration in building energy efficiency, proposes the concept of change and redesign of government supervision in building energy efficiency and relocates the role of government supervision. Based on the theory of regulation economics and modern management, analyses and researches the function and responsibility of the government at all levels in executing the building energy efficiency supervision system of government office buildings and large-scale public buildings, and defines the importance of government regulation in energy efficiency supervision system. Explores the interaction mechanism with gaming characteristics between government and government office building owners, commonweal public building owners, large-scale commercial building owners, energy efficiency service organizations, and presents some measures to put it in practice for convergence of the benefits of the government and other relative subjects.
作者 戴雪芝 武涌
出处 《暖通空调》 北大核心 2007年第8期1-7,共7页 Heating Ventilating & Air Conditioning
关键词 节能监管 政府规制 变迁与再设计 互动机理 利益共同体 energy efficiency supervision, government regulation, change and redesign, interaction mechanism, common benefit community
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参考文献7

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