退出成本、经理行为与国有企业改革

Exit Cost,Behavior of Managers and Reform of SOEs

本文在现有理论的基础上将退出成本引入对经理行为的分析。分析表明,退出成本的存在会使经理采取积极行动以避免退出,经理的努力水平会随着退出成本的增加而提高;通过提高经理的退出成本,所有者以较少的剩余索取权激励使经理提供相同的努力水平。本文认为,退出成本过低是导致当前国有企业效率低下的重要原因之一。国有企业改革应该多管齐下,在当前推行产权改革、治理结构优化和剥离政策性负担、引入竞争机制等一系列改革措施的同时,政府还应该采取措施以提高国有企业经理的退出成本,以避免其他改革措施事倍功半。

This paper employs exit cost to analyze the behavior of managers. Our results show that the existence of exit cost will induce managers to work harder. To a certain extent, the more exit cost, the harder managers will work. By increasing exit cost, owners can make managers provide equal effort with less residual claim rights. We argue that, as one of the most important causes, low exit cost also lead to inefficiency of stateowned enterprises （SOEs）. The reform of SOEs requires different resolutions like property fight reform, governance reform, reducing policy burden, introducing competition mechanism etc. We believe measures what increasing exit cost of will make other reform revolutions more effective.