想像力:先验结构还是能力?

Imagination:Transcendental Structure or Capability

康德在《纯粹理性批判》①的导言中就表明了自己的哲学理想,这一理想最终是以追问"形而上学作为科学是如何可能的?"的形式表达出来的。康德认为所有哲学问题的解决终究要以形而上学问题的解决为基础和开端,所谓"纯粹理性批判"其实是"批判纯粹理性",通过澄清前提和划清界限来进一步牢固形而上学的根基——理性,从而使形而上学作为科学成为可能。"想像力"概念在康德哲学中的土壤依然还是先验哲学,作为先验结构要素的想像力是知性的一种机能,它连接着知性和感性。而一系列无可避免的追问是:想像力自身是什么?除了作为一种知性和感性之间的逻辑连接符号,它本身有没有内容呢?如果这种内容是和感性相关联的,那么这种关联的意义何在呢?

In the introduction to Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Kant expresses his philosophy by asking 'how metaphysics as science is possible?' Kant believes that the solution of all philosophical problems starts and ends with the solution of metaphysical problems, and 'critique of pure reason' means 'criticism on pure reason'. Thorough clarifying the preconditions and demarking the boundaries, the strengthening of rationality which is the foundation of metaphysics can make metaphysics as science possible. The concept of imagination is based on transcendental philosophy in Kantian philosophy. Imagination as a key element in the transcendental structure is a mechanism in understanding, connecting understanding with perception. However, what really imagination is? As a logical connective sign between understanding and perception, does it have its own content? If it is related to perception, what is the significance of this connection?