美国经常账户融资机制“抵押”观点的实证检验及其启示

An Empirical Test on the "Collateral" View about the US Current Account Financing Mechanism and Its Inspirations

基于相关国家数据样本的协整检验表明:虽然Dooley等学者的美国经常账户融资机制"抵押"观点对于亚洲国家总体具有显著的合理性,但中国的数据对此并不支持。"抵押"关系的存在性使当前的全球经济不平衡具备了一定的现实合理性,并有助于为实现全球经济失衡的平稳调节赢得时间。而中国样本的独特性则意味着:中国经济目前所面临的困境,难以用传统的国际经济学理论解释,也无法简单归结为内部问题,而是由现行国际货币体系的本质特征所决定的但却带有偶然性的外部冲击所致。因此,要解决我国的流动性严重过剩问题以摆脱眼前的经济困境,除进行传统的货币政策操作之外,必须采取针对性更强的联合措施。

In the context of the current international monetary system, this paper makes a test on Dooley＇s ＂eollaterar＇ viewpoint about the relationship between international capital flow and US current account financing mechanism by means of a co - integration analysis method which takes China and its periphery countries as samples respectively. The test results show that Chinese data do not coincide with the point, though Dooley and other scholars make use of Chinese data as their grounds of argument. Meanwhile, an almost reversed conclusion can be drawn from other data, that is, the mechanism described ＇,y the ＂collateral＂ view has a notable rationality. The conclusion above can help to understand and dissolve the current global imbalance and China＇s economic dilemma ultimately.