上市公司总经理更换、高管团队重组与企业绩效改进

A Study on the Listed Companies'General Manager Turnover,Top Management Team Recomposition and Firm Performance Improvement

本文针对以往总经理更换理论研究存在的关键问题,特别是对高管团队重组现象的忽视,构建了新的理论假设,并利用中国上市公司数据进行了检验。研究发现,总经理被迫离职时企业绩效呈现改进之面貌,但常规离职时无此效应;国有控股阻碍了企业绩效改进而内部董事则反之,且在总经理被迫离职情况下,前者负效应减弱而后者正效应增强;总经理是否为竞争者继任对企业绩效改进无显著影响,而选择外部继任对其有显著负面效应;总经理更换后的高管团队重组总体上不利于企业绩效改进,但受到继任类型的调节作用,在外部继任情形下消极影响尤为明显,而对竞争者继任则具有积极作用。

To answer the question whether general manager （GM）＇s turnover can improve firm＇s performance, the authors of this article believe some important determinants were ignored in the literature, especially the recomposition of top management team （TMT） following GM＇s turnover. So, the authors set up new theoretical hypothesis and test them with data of China＇s listed companies. Some conclusions are drawn from this empirical research. Firstly, only in the case of the GM＇s forced turnover, firm＇s performance can be improved. Secondly, the degree of performance improvement is negatively related to the presence of state-owned shareholders but the effect becomes weaker when the GM is forced to turnover. Thirdly, percentage of inside directors has positive effect on the performance and it will be stronger in condition of GM＇s forced turnover. Fourthly, whether GM is the contender has no significant effect on performance but if GM is succeeded from the outside of corporate will cause lower performance. Finally, the recomposition of TMT can＇t improve firm＇s performance in most cases, but its effect is influenced by the moderation of sucession style. Specially, under the secession of outsider, the negative effect will be higher, but conversely it has positive effect if succeeded GM is the contender.