不完全信息下跨国兼并模型分析

Analysis on Cross-Border Merger Model under Information Asymmetry

本文主要通过对不完全信息跨国兼并模型的分析,发现如果没有政府干预,外国企业只要具有成本上的优势,跨国兼并的发生是不可避免的。其中不完全信息并不是市场实现兼并的障碍,而政府在维护、平衡市场兼并效率和社会福利的关系方面中扮演着重要角色。

In this paper we have investigated the cross - border mergers in a Cournot duopoly set up with asymmetric information. It is shown that cross - border merger will be evitable if a foreign enterprise has advantage of cost compared to a host enterprise. Asymmetric information alone does not become a hindrance of cross merger in a Cournot duopoly market and the Government can play an important role in mergers and antitrust policy.