作为信号发送和可置信承诺的国企改革

SOE Reform as Signaling and Credible Commitment

本文提出了两个关于FDI如何促进国企改革的假说:信号发送假说和可置信承诺假说。在信息不对称下,国企改革可以成为一个地方政府开明程度的信号,为了发送信号吸引FDI,地方政府有动力进行更多的国企改革。同时,国企改革减少了地方政府干预市场的动机,从而使得维护公平竞争的承诺变得可信,因此能吸引更多的FDI。本文对这两个假说进行了检验,结果显示,信号发送假说较好地吻合了1991-1996年期间中国东部沿海地区的情况。

This paper proposes two hypotheses concerning how FDI facilitate SOE reforms： signaling and credible commitment hypotheses. Under asymmetrical information, SOE reform may act as a signal for the types of the local government： open or conservative. In order to convince the foreign investors that it is open, the local government has motivation to enforce more SOE reforms. Meanwhile, the SOE reform decreases the incentive of the local government to intervene at the market, which would make it credible commitment to maintaining fair competition and hence attract more FDI. We test the two hypotheses and the signaling hypotheses turned out to be consistent with the case of the eastern China during the period from 1991 to 1996.