大用户直购电试点现行转运定价机制

Present Wheeling Cost Mechanism of Direct Power-purchase Pilot for Large Consumers

大用户直购电作为单一购买者模式的补充,是在发电侧开放的基础上开展售电侧竞争的有益尝试,而转运定价机制是大用户直购电的核心。结合我国区域电力市场的运营实际,比较发电商、大用户和电网公司在直购电模式下的收益变化,建立数学模型。通过模型,分析各市场主体之间的利益博弈行为,提出"转运风险收益"的概念,并推导出购售双方达成直购电交易的必要条件。最后结合简单算例,对大用户直购电试点现行转运定价机制的优越性与存在问题进行深入探讨,为我国电价机制改革提供参考。

As a supplement of single purchaser form, the direct power-purchase for large consumers attempts to introduce the competition mechanism to the sale-side based on the complete opening of the generation-side. However, wheeling cost mechanism is the core of direct power-purchase for large consumers. Considering the actuality of Chinese regional electricity market, comparing the earning changes of power providers, large consumers and power grid company under direct power-purchase mode, some mathematic models are developed. With these models, the gaming behaviors of main market players are analyzed. Then the concept of transmission risk-return is introduced, and the necessary condition of direct power-purchase is also deduced. Finally, using a simple calculation example, the advantages and disadvantages of present wheeling cost mechanism of direct power-purchase pilot of large consumers of China are deeply discussed, which can be considered as a reference to the reform of electricity pricing mechanism of China.