摘要
对引入工程质量保险上海试点模式前后的工程质量保险制度的质量控制激励效应进行了分析,发现对于建设单位建成后通过出售来获得投资回报的工程,如果保险人能够观察到被保险人的风险状况并据此制定保费,引入工程质量保险上海试点模式会使建设单位的质量控制水平有所提高,施工单位的质量控制水平基本不变,但勘察、设计和监理单位的质量控制水平严重下降,最终造成工程质量基本不变或略有下降;如果保险人不能够观察到被保险人的风险状况并据此制定保费,则引入工程质量保险上海试点模式会造成工程质量问题的严重恶化。
This paper analyzed the quality control incentive effects of Inherent Defects Insurance against Buildings （IDIB） of Shanghai Mode, and found that, for projects that had been invested for getting sale profits, if insurers could observe the insured＇s risk condition and decided premium accurately, introducing IDIB of Shanghai Mode can improve owners＇ quality control level, maintain contractors＇ quality control level, and lower quality control level of reeonnaissaneers, designers and engineers, finally maintain or lightly lower the projects quality. If insurers could not observe the insured＇s risk condition and decided premium accurately, introducing IDIB of Shanghai Mode will deteriorate the projects quality severely.
出处
《建筑经济》
北大核心
2007年第9期5-9,共5页
Construction Economy
关键词
工程质量保险
质量控制
激励效应
Inherent Defects Insurance against Buildings（ IDIB ）
quality control
incentive effects
