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基于声誉、法律和不完全契约的执行

Reputation,Law and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts
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摘要 随着市场经济的发展,声誉机制作为一项能为人们提供长期稳定预期的重要制度安排日益受到重视。同时,随着社会开放程度的增强,匿名交易范围不断扩大,而交易的完成需要契约的支撑。由于事件的不确定性以及契约的不完全性导致了契约在大多数情况下不能自我实施,契约的实施主要有两种手段——基于声誉的私人执行机制以及基于法律的第三方公开执行机制。另外,两种契约实施方式之间存在着密切的关系,法律执行方式依赖于当事人对声誉的重视程度,而声誉执行方式又要求法律具有较强的威慑力。 With the development of market economy,the mechanism of reputation has received more and more attention,which can offer long and stable expectation as an important institution.At the same time,the scope of anonymous transactions extends gradually with the enhancement of social opening extent,while the completion of transactions does need the support of contracts.Due to the uncertainty of affairs and incompleteness of contracts,contracts can not be enforced automatically.There are two main ways with respect to the enforcement of contracts:the private enforcement mechanism based on reputation and the third open enforcement mechanism based on law.And there exists close relationship between the two enforcement mechanisms:the style of law enforcement mechanism depends on the agent's concern of reputation,while the style of reputation enforcement mechanism resorts to the strong threat of law.
作者 王玉玲
出处 《山东商业职业技术学院学报》 2007年第4期67-71,共5页 Journal of Shandong Institute of Commerce and Technology
关键词 声誉 契约 法律 契约实施机制 reputation incomplete contracts law enforcement mechanism
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参考文献12

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