基于博弈论的洪水保险需求分析

Flood insurance demand analysis based on game theory

在实证研究的基础上,从博弈论的角度分析了我国政府现行的救灾制度与洪水保险需求间的关系.博弈的结果表明,在消费者不投保的前提下,政府必须对灾后救济负责,因此这种灾后救助实际上造成了对洪水保险需求的侵蚀,而且导致了政府在博弈中的"后动劣势".改变这一博弈结果的办法是改变博弈的时序,由政府首先行动,作出关于救灾制度的规定等承诺,从而变"后动劣势"为先动优势.

Positive analysis of the relations between post-flood government aid and flood insurance demand in China is given based on game theory. It is showed that the government must take the responsibility for post-flood assistance if consumers have not bought flood insurance et ante. Flood insurance demand is eroded by government aid in fact which induce the second mover disadvantage of the govern- ment. The solutions are to change the timing of the government action. That is, the government must take the first move such as et ante commitment to change the second mover disadvantage.