现金股利:缓解代理问题还是大股东剥削——基于最终所有权结构视角的研究

Cash Dividend:Alleviating Agency Cost or Tunneling——A Study from The View of Ultimate Ownership

文章以2003年我国沪市的469家上市公司为研究样本,对公司的现金股利政策进行了研究。结果表明:最终控制股东的所有权结构对公司股利政策取向影响显著。当最终控制股东具有高现金流权和低分离系数(控制权/现金流权)的所有权结构时,更倾向于派发现金股利,分配的现金股利比率也更高,支持股利政策的大股东剥削假说;公司选择现金股利的概率,以及派发现金股利比率与公司现金流、成长性没有显著的相关性,不支持派发现金股利是为了缓解公司内部委托代理问题的研究假设。

The authors examine dividend policies for 469 listed companies in China and find that companies with highly cash flow rights and lowly separation ratio are apt to choose cash dividend policies. These evidences support the large shareholder tunneling hypothesis. Moreover, the authors find that cash dividend policies are uncorrelated with companies＇ free cash flows and growth ratio. These evidences suggest that companies choosing cash dividend policies not be for the sake of affiliating agency problem between shareholders and managers.