Internet环境下混合市场渠道协调的数量折扣模型

A Quantity Discount Model for Coordination of Internet-based Hybrid Channels

目的是定量研究在混合渠道模式下达成渠道上下游协调(即渠道总利润最大化)的数量折扣机制.建立了促使混合渠道达成协调状态的Stackelberg数量折扣博弈模型,并对渠道协调后的利润分配问题作了初步探讨.结果表明,制造商促使混合渠道达成协调的数量折扣有无穷多个,在一定的数量折扣范围内制造商和零售商合作(即协调)后的利润均大于不合作的情形.Internet直销渠道的增加并不一定意味着对传统零售商的威胁,制造商自有渠道和传统零售渠道在相互竞争的同时又可选择合作,达成"双赢"局面.

The hybrid channels consisted of direct Intemet channel and traditional retailer is dominating the marketing of modem manufacturers. Based on a quantitative method, the paper aims to study the quantity discount mechanism for the coordination （i. e., maximizing the total channel profit） of hybrid channels. A Staekellierg game model is established, and an initial analysis on sharing the after-coordination profits is presented. The results show that manufacturer can provide infinite quantity discounts for coordination of hybrid channels, some of which can make both manufacturer and retailer enjoy greater cooperative profits than under non - cooperative situation. The introduction of Intemet channel doesn＇t mean a threat to retailer, in that the competing manufacturer and retailer can choose to cooperate to reach a ＂win-win＂ situation.