摘要
利用2001年~2005年深沪两市A股上市公司的面板数据,研究多元化战略通过合作需求对高管团队内的薪酬差距及其激励作用的影响。实证分析结果表明,多元化中各业务间相关程度的加大和业务种类数量的增加在提升高管团队内薪酬差距的同时会降低薪酬差距对业绩的激励作用。进一步的分析发现,出现上述现象的原因在于,一方面,薪酬主要由董事会与CEO设定,在高度合作需求下,薪酬差距的大小主要反映了他们希望以内部竞争来克服代理问题的意愿;另一方面,薪酬差距对业绩的激励作用不仅仅取决于董事会与CEO设定薪酬时的意愿,在很大程度上取决于非CEO高管人员在接受薪酬后的反应。这一研究结果为进一步完善中国上市公司的激励机制提供了经验证据。
Using the panel data of Chinese listed firms during 2001-2005, this paper makes an empirical test on the relationship among top executives' pay gap, coordination needs and diversification strategies. The results show that high coordination needs will raise top executives' pay gap, but in the same time, high coordination needs will decrease the incentive effect of top executives' pay gap. There are two reasons for this result. On one hand, the pay gap is set by the board and the CEO with the intention to solve the agency problem in coordination. On the other hand, the incentive effect of top executives' pay gap not only lies on the board and the CEO, but also on other top manager in the team. The results of this paper will provide some empirical evidences for improving the incentive of listed companies in China.
出处
《管理科学》
CSSCI
2007年第4期30-37,共8页
Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金(70572064)
广东省普通高校人文社会科学重点研究基地重大研究项目(04JDXM63006)
关键词
高管团队
薪酬差距
合作需求
多元化
top executives
pay gap
coordination needs
diversification strategies