政府管制下的水权制度博弈分析

Game Analysis of Government-controlled Water Right System

政府管制下的水权制度通常基于全流域的整体利益对流域水资源进行优化配置,但是由于信息不对称,管理者无法得知用水户的真实收益函数,以及委托—代理等原因,会出现"政府失灵"。通过深入分析在水权制度体系下政府管理者与用水户的行为特点,针对双方不同的行为方式,可以为政府管理者提供有效的政策工具,以减少因"政府失灵"所导致的制度失效。本文从水权制度运行的微观层面出发,对政府管理者和用水户之间的行为进行了博弈分析,考察了在不同的政策下双方的行为变化,以及对水权制度所产生的影响。认为政府可以通过降低检查成本、加强内部管理、提高超额罚金以及对不同类型的用水户进行差别对待等方式,使得用水户降低超额取水的频率,以实现全流域水资源优化配置的制度目标。

Govemment-controlled water fight system normally offers an optimized allocation based on general interest of the whole river basin. However, ＂government failure＂, such as excess water withdrawal, happens frequently, because governors can not find out water users＇ actual revenue functions at reasonable costs as a result of asymmetric information and principle-agent problems do exist in this situation. The purpose of this article is to offer some policy instruments for the governors to avoid the ineffectiveness of the water right system through finding the characteristics of the behaviors of the governors and the water users. This article created the repeated game between the governors and the water users based on a water quota plan, and analyzed the factors which could affect the pure Nash equilibrium and the mixed Nash equilibrium respectively and how they worked. The results show that governor should adopt some pohcy instruments or the mixture of them to make the water users reduce the frequency of excess water taking. These pohcy instruments include reducing the cost of governing, improving the management of governors, increasing the amercement of excess water taking, and amercing different kinds of water users discriminatingly.