摘要
专利联盟这一新的经济组织近年来引起了众多学者的关注。本文以Shapiro Carl(2000)的模型为基础,从博弈论的角度对互补性专利持有企业的许可行为进行了研究,并将其对产品市场的影响作了进一步的比较分析,研究表明:专利联盟内的协调、约束机制的存在是企业的获得较高许可收益的保证,并且联盟可以提高产品市场的均衡产量,降低单位产品的成本和价格,改善社会福利水平。
As a new form of economic organization, patent pool has attracted many scholars in recent years. Based on the model of Shapiro Carl （2000）, this paper analyses the actions of the complementary patent holders by game theory, and makes a further comparative analysis of the impact of product market. The research shows that the patent pool can enhance the profits of patentees because of the presence of the coordination and restraint mechanism, reduce the cost and price of product, increase the outputs and raise social welfare.
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSCD
2007年第4期153-156,共4页
Operations Research and Management Science
关键词
经济博弈
打包许可
完全信息博弈
专利联盟
economic game theory
package license
game of complete information
patent pool
